As concerns persist over the effectiveness of official aid, and global partners seek better ways to promote development, donors have increasingly allocated funds through non-government organizations (NGOs) to sidestep the "capture" problem associated with public aid flows in poor countries and bring services directly to those who need them. Despite this shift, surprisingly little data is available on exactly how much money is spent by NGOs in each recipient nation. This paper explores the data gap by comparing existing measures of NGO presence and presenting a new series. The exercise raises important questions about whether NGOs are effectively promoting development.
Introduction
The emergence of NGOs as major actors on the global stage is one of the most intriguing phenomena of the early 21 st century. Giant organizations like World Vision
International, CARE, Catholic Relief Services or Soros International have multimilliondollar budgets to spend on development, and are assuming a role alongside governments and multinational firms as important players and even transformers of policies and institutions in the countries where they operate (Doh and Guay, 2006 , Keck and Sikkink, 1998 , Lawrence et al, 2002 . Additionally, many of them act as a "conscience" to multinational firms and have had an impact on corporate strategy (Hess, et al., 2002) .
NGOs, according to the United Nations definition, are non-profit, voluntary citizens´ groups that are organized on a local, national or international level. They may be of three types: 1) advocacy NGOs, who promote before governments or in international fora the interests of groups who do not have either voice or access to do so themselves;
2) operational NGOs, that provide goods and services to needy clients; and 3) "hybrid"
NGOs, which perform both of the previous functions . Generally, they are organized around specific issues (e.g., human rights, health, environmental protection), and in their areas of concern they can serve as early warning mechanisms or monitors of official agreements. According to the United Nations Development Program, by the end of the 20 th century there were more than 50,000 NGOs working at the grass-roots level in developing countries, and their activities were affecting the lives of 250 million individuals. (Besley & Ghatak, 1999) .
Operational and hybrid NGOs have been active in areas such as social services for decades, often in collaboration with governments or private partners. The United States has a particularly rich history of these types of partnerships (Salamon, 1987) . NGOs IE Business School Working Paper EC-123-I 17/02/2011 3 offer a number of distinct advantages that can enhance the provision of social services or the promotion of social needs, whether in cooperation with business or government.
They include the following (Nancy & Yontcheva, 2006 and Yaziji, 2004 ):
• They generally enjoy a great degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the public
• They are well attuned to public concerns, and to the needs of specific groups that might not be represented by the market or defended by the government
• Their dense, extensive networks are different from those of the typical multinational enterprise or government
• Their members and representatives have technical expertise in the issue at hand, often due to having worked in difficult settings or with underserved populations
• They are often more cost-effective than their private or public partner.
NGOs also suffer from some drawbacks, chief among them their relative immunity from transparency and accountability, their dependence on donors for funds (Kapstein, 2000) and their short-run approach to financing and planning (Davis & Etchart, 1999) .
Nevertheless, the strengths noted above have led governments and multilateral institutions to direct more and more funding through them. Concerns in the 1980s over government failure and the superiority of non-state actors accelerated this process (Collier 2002 , Kamat 2003 . The United States has sought to increasingly engage private corporations, foundations, trade associations, civil society and NGOs in the design and implementation of its development assistance (US Department of State).
Other countries, concerned about the weakness or corruption of developing-country governments, are moving in the same direction (Chege, 1999 , Nancy & Yontcheva, 2006 The data problem and existing sources The nature of the data problem is presented in Figure 1 . (1.), (2.) and (3.) are sources of income for NGOs, which they spend on their activities. (4.) would represent the total sum of NGO spending. What is important to researchers is to move from (4.) to (5.), in order to determine in which specific countries those funds are being spent, so that they can test the effectiveness of NGOs in pursuing development goals.
The most accurate reflection of (5. and no international register exists to our knowledge that reports how much money is spent by each of the tens of thousands of NGOs in every country where they are active.
One scholar concerned about the lack of data on NGOs, Dirk-Jean Koch, assembled a data set which is probably the most complete and representative of the ones discussed in this study (Koch, D.J. 2007 Koch, therefore, captures a fraction of (5.) and a single year with his data set. What other sources of information could be used to approximate NGO spending by recipient country? To try to get a better picture of (5.), one approach would be to try to estimate the size of (1.), (2.) and/or (3.) by recipient country. Most funding for NGOs appears to come from private sources, or (3.) above. The NGO registry maintained by USAID shows that, for the organizations registered with USAID, 56% of the funding for non-US NGOs and 76% for US NGOs comes from private sources (see table 2 ).
Unfortunately, no estimates are available for (3.) However, there are official estimates of the size of (1.) by recipient country, which gives some valuable insight into where at least the publicly-funded portion of NGO spending is directed. A group of developed countries reports every year to the OECD how much government aid they give to NGOs ((1.) in Figure 1 ). The OECD tracks this data in its development database at OECD.Stat, which breaks total official development aid down into specific uses (food aid, humanitarian aid, technical assistance, debt relief, etc.) and institutions There is yet another public actor who is an important donor to NGOs, and that is the European Commission of the European Union. The European Commission has a long . We took the available OECD data and summed it with country-level data where it was reported on national websites, to create a new data set on official development aid flowing through NGOs by recipient country, for all or part of the 2000-2008 period. This is probably the best estimate available at the present time of (1.) in Figure 1 , covering most of the last decade.
3 These countries, with full or partial data since 2000, are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan.
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. tradition of channeling aid to and through NGOs which present projects for financing in developing countries. Information on the amount of aid that it provides is broken down by recipient country in line B 6-7000 of the Commission budget. This data set was used by Nancy & Yontcheva (2006) in an empirical paper that attempted to evaluate the impact of NGO activity on developing countries. While EC aid represents only a small proportion of the overall spending of NGOs in developing countries (less than 3% of total government funding and probably less than half that proportion of total NGO spending), it is still useful to see how this fraction of aid contributes to the geographical distribution of NGO spending.
The sum of OECD, EU and national government sources, which we present in this paper, may be the most complete data set available on NGO spending by recipient country, and is a good approximation to ( An initial look at this data set also yields some interesting insights about NGO spending in developing countries. In comparison with official development aid (ODA), NGO spending is much smaller as a per cent of recipient GDP, which comes as no surprise.
The correlation between the geographical allocation of spending according to the two data sets is 0.52, indicating that governments and government-supported NGOs are making similar but certainly not identical decisions on the distribution of funds. Percentages are calculated over total NGO funding specified by region for countries that report a regional breakdown; figures on funding that indicate only "developing countries general" are excluded from the total.
When the different series are compared with the characteristics of recipient countries, some contrasts emerge which initially suggest both positive and negative implications for the role of NGOs in development aid worldwide. Both ODA and governmentfunded NGO spending are negatively correlated with the GDP per capita in PPPs of the recipient country, which is a desirable result: more aid flows to the poorest countries.
However, the negative correlation is much stronger for ODA (-0.41) than for NGO funding (-0.28). This shows that official aid is more highly concentrated in the countries with the greatest economic needs, to a greater extent than at least the officially-funded portion of NGO spending.
Another concern about NGOs´ role arises when funds are compared with control of corruption in the recipient country, as measured by the World Governance Indicators (Kauffman, et al: 2009) . Official development aid has a negative correlation with control of corruption in the receiving country (-0.16), meaning that more official aid tends to flow to more corrupt environments. There is a slightly larger negative correlation between corruption control and NGO funding (-0.19 ). This shows that neither official aid nor government funds to NGOs are shunning corrupt environments.
NGOs, in fact, appear to be selecting slightly less carefully among recipient countries;
at least the portion of their funds which comes from governments is more highly concentrated in countries whose governments are more corrupt. This small difference, if it were confirmed by overall spending figures, would weakly confirm the role of NGOs as a conduit that enables donors to bypass corrupt host governments. (See table 6 for correlations among these indicators.) On a recipient-country level, the NGO data set shows some interesting patterns. Afghanistan also shows very high levels of government funding of NGOs, as noted above. These two cases underline the need for greater transparency in NGO spending figures, and raise the question of how NGOs might be "captured" by donor governments for foreign-policy objectives. A list of the top recipients of NGO funding is included in table 8. In an attempt to provide yet another perspective on where NGOs are most involved in When the different sets are ranked by the size of spending or funding in recipient countries, interesting contrasts emerge which may point up some of the pitfalls of using 
Discussion and conclusions
The objective of this paper has been to cast more light on the extent and dimensions of NGO activity in the developing world by exploring the characteristics and limitations of existing indicators and offering a new data set for researchers. In the process, certain concerns have arisen about where NGOs are concentrating their activities.
It appears that governments are selecting to a certain degree among countries as a function of their political or strategic priorities when they finance NGOs. It is possible that private donations are able to offset this government-induced bias in NGO activity. It is also unclear that NGOs are taking a powerful role as an alternate conduit for government aid funds in corrupt countries. In Africa, where concerns over governance are voiced most loudly, government funding of NGOs was actually (very slightly)
positively correlated with corruption control. In the developing world as a whole, correlation figures do not confirm that NGOs are either shunning corrupt environments or strongly concentrating their activities in these countries so that they can serve as an alternate conduit for official aid.
Our data even show that NGO funding is less concentrated in the world´s poorest countries than official development aid funds for the 2000-2008 period overall. The difference is not enormous and could be offset by the private donations that are omitted from our data set, but it does give cause for concern.
All of these observations raise objections to the arguments for the significant NGO presence on the world stage and their legitimacy as alternative actors in the pursuit of development objectives. The data limitations of this study make any conclusions very preliminary. If, however, they were confirmed by fuller data that included private funding over a series of years, they could call into question the special vocation of NGOs as alternative vehicles for development aid. As it is, the questions raised by this exercise underline the need for much better reporting so that the role of NGOs can be evaluated in a more comprehensive way.
Much remains to be done to assemble a good representative data set on NGO spending by recipient country, and the task is daunting. For researchers to collect spending information on each individual development NGO is almost unthinkable. Even putting together data from government donors has involved months of legwork. Placing the burden on NGOs to report their spending by recipient country would add layers to their administrative tasks and divert resources from their real objectives. Yet it does appear that NGOs themselves are the best equipped to provide the data that is needed.
In the interest of transparency, the task of receiving and processing NGO spending data by recipient country might best be left to an international agency such as the United Nations, which already registers NGOs. Alternatively, a non-profit organization such as the Directory of Development Organizations might add spending data to its array of information on global NGOs. This information should include an estimate of how much of the budgets overall go to administrative spending, to arrive at a more accurate figure for NGO activity in developing countries. If this data were to become available, academics would still have to wait several years before they could address two key questions about NGOs, which are how variable or consistent their spending in recipient countries is over time, and whether they can engage in long-term planning in order to pursue their objectives over a greater time horizon.
If NGOs are to continue as key international actors in the pursuit of development in the world´s poorest countries, governments and scholars alike need to have the necessary information to evaluate the effectiveness of the billions of dollars that are being donated to NGOs every year. The need for good spending data by NGOs is not simply an
